Pacific pushes ahead milestone initiative for resilient energy policy systems (Island Business)

By Tevita Motulalo*

December 2013

Topics

Energy

Opinion

The Pacific is growing in its geostrategic value to global power projections. Having the region vulnerable to economic collapse—driven by acute energy deficiency and price volatility—is to entertain competition and conflict. This invites instability in a region whose control is central and inimical to global power relationships, especially between East and West.

On September 27th, in New York City, on the sidelines of the 68th United Nations General Assembly, eleven Pacific islands leaders signed a “pivotal” declaration in front of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The declaration called for the establishment of a Pacific Regional Data Repository (PRDR). That dry language makes it easy to miss that the declaration was groundbreaking in several ways. To understand why, requires going back a few years to the founding of the Tonga Energy Road Map (TERM).

Policy Perspective: India’s strategic imperative in the South Pacific (Gateway House)

23 DECEMBER 2013, Gateway House

Policy Perspectives from Gateway House give an overview of a global issue that has implications for India’s policy-making and business community. This edition examines the geoeconomic and geostrategic imperatives for expanding India’s engagement with the South Pacific

BY Tevita Motulalo 

SENIOR RESEARCHER

Summary

As the global centre of gravity shifts to the Indo-Pacific, triggered in part by Chinese expansion and the U.S.’s Pacific “rebalancing,” an expanding Indian engagement with the South Pacific becomes a geoeconomic and geostrategic imperative.

The South Pacific sits at the “pivot” of the Pacific rebalancing. It is a largely stable region with a relatively small population; it has abundant resources; it is at the crossroads of vibrant and growing maritime trade routes; and it is increasingly strategically located. Under the “one country, one vote” rule of most international fora, the 14 Pacific Island Countries (PICs) play a significant role in deciding international institutional legitimacy, which is increasingly important for India as it seeks a greater role in global affairs.

There is enormous scope for closer economic, political, and strategic ties between India and the South Pacific. Ties between the two are already friendly and age-old, with myriad cultural compatibilities. But if India continues to neglect the region, it will become increasingly difficult for India to maintain, or to regain, a toehold, while other powers like China manoeuvre for, and establish, entrenched positions.

Just one example of India’s low-key engagement in the region: it has only two High Commissions in the 14 PICs. One is in Fiji, because of its sizeable Indian diaspora, the other is in Papua New Guinea, because of trade and minerals. India routinely goes unrepresented at regional meetings held in the other 12 PICs. In contrast, China has a major diplomatic mission in almost every PIC.

India and the PICs only need to build the right bridges to come together to make the South Pacific and thereby the greater Indo-Pacific more economically, politically, and strategically secure. Others have already realised the region’s potential and are moving fast. Will India catch the South Pacific wave, or be washed over by it?

Dimensions

1. Changing geopolitics: The South Pacific was, until recently, a western backwater “managed” by Australia and New Zealand (NZ). However, the growing economic and strategic importance of the area, combined with regional dissatisfaction with Australia and NZ, have opened up the PICs to other direct bilateral partnerships that bypass Aus­tralia and NZ. New (or renewed) players include China, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.

2. China’s role in the PICs: China’s involve­ment in the PICs is widespread. This includes visits by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army; exchanges of high-level delegations; abundant soft loans; copious Chinese scholarships for PIC stu­dents; and ethnic Chinese controlling about 80% of the retail sector in countries like the Kingdom of Tonga. However, in many PICs, there is a deep suspicion of the recent surge in Chinese immigra­tion and of the role China is playing in the region.

3. Duelling trade deals: After long years of neglect of the region, in 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a “pivot” to Asia. Part of that plan is moving 60% of the U.S. Navy into the Pacific. Another element of U.S. re-engage­ment is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), a proposed free trade initiative currently consisting of 11 countries (and excluding China), with a collective GDP of around $25 trillion. In part to counter this, China is involved in another proposed regional deal, the Regional Comprehen­sive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP will cover a population of over 3 billion people, around 27% of global trade, and around $21 tril­lion, but it does not include the U.S. India is taking a balanced approach, hoping to capitalise on both.

4. India and Fiji: India’s ethnic-Indian Fiji-focused policy for the South Pacific has been limit­ing – even counter-productive – for India, both in Fiji and in the wider region. It has given the other PICs the impression that India is mostly focused on ethnic Indians in the region, rather than on true nation-to-nation engagement. China, conversely, has engaged broadly in Fiji, and now is more influ­ential in Fijian policy-making than India. Broad partnerships with the PICs will not only give India more leverage when lobbying on behalf of the diaspora, it will also create wider economic and political benefits for India and the region. 

5. Trade not aid: The region is naturally rich and getting comparatively richer. However, both Aus­tralia and NZ play up the “aid” narrative in the PICs. The two countries use aid for leverage, for example by gaining preferential access to resourc­es in the PICs like fisheries and minerals, while at the same time flooding the PICs with Australian and NZ goods and services, and protecting their own markets from competitive PIC products. The PICs are presented as net aid recipients. However, they contribute far more to the economies of Aus­tralia and NZ than they receive in aid. The PICs don’t want aid, they want trade: access to competi­tively priced, reliable products (such as products from India) and market access for their products. 

6. Scope for economic engagement: The small-scale economies and societies in the Pacific are compatible with the Indian models of village-scale economies and societies. The scope for Indian businesses in the domestic and industrial markets in the PICs is significant. For example, most of the consumer goods in the PICs are either low-cost and low-quality Chinese goods or high-cost Aus­tralian and NZ products. In Tonga, a used 14-year-old Toyota costs US $7000. A brand new Tato Nano from India costs half that amount. Across the board, there is a wide opening for reasonably priced, rugged, Indian goods and services, includ­ing transportation, information technology and communication hardware and software, agricultur­al equipment, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, tele-medicine, and tele-education.

The way forward

1. Take the ‘long-tail’: The South Pacific is ripe for “long-tail” economic engagement, in which profits are made by selling a small amount of a large number of unique products. It will benefit India and the PICs to create a “long-tail” consortium of Indian goods and services providers. The consortium could have one or more agents in each PIC, representing the products locally, giving microfinance ser­vices for the purchase, and providing after-purchase care. The shipping and handling costs would be minimised by the consortium sharing shipping space and the services of the local agent to handle customs and other for­malities. Increased political engagement will follow increased economic engagement.

2. Start with Tonga: A good testing site for this model is the Kingdom of Tonga, a stable, well-educated, English-speaking parliamenta­ry monarchy. Tonga was never colonised and, as the last Kingdom in Polynesia, has infor­mal, but deep, sway in the region. The royal family also provides Tonga with unusual access to key decision-makers outside the region, as it has long-standing, and often personal, ties with other royal families, for example in Japan, Thailand, and Britain. Tonga’s role as a region­al leader is increasingly being recognised. In May 2013, for example, Tonga hosted the inau­gural South Pacific Defence Meeting, which included New Zealand, Australia, and Chile. In doing this, Tonga led the region in working towards greater security cooperation. Each in their own spheres, India and Tonga have both successfully been at the forefront in drawing the model for emerging sustainable economies and democracies. 

3. Dovetail and expand: Once tested in Tonga, the long-tail economic model, dovetail­ing with long-tail Indian diplomacy (such as appointing more representatives to the region), can be rolled out throughout the South Pacif­ic. Eventually, the model can be expanded to other previously overlooked, but increasingly important, long-tail environments such as the Caribbean and parts of Africa.

You can download the PDF version of this Policy Perspective, here.

Compiled by Tevita Motulalo, Senior Researcher, Maritime Studies, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. 

For feedback or comments, please contact info@gatewayhouse.in or 022-22897854.

http://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-strategic-imperative-in-the-south-pacific-2/

Full Report: India’s Strategic Imperative in the South Pacific (Gateway House)

13 NOVEMBER 2013, Gateway House
This report analyses the significance of expanding India’s engagement with the South Pacific in the backdrop of mounting global interest in the region

BY Tevita Motulalo 

SENIOR RESEARCHER

 India’s Strategic Imperative in the South Pacific

This summary is a part of the larger report, titled ‘India’s Strategic Imperative in the South Pacific,’ authored by Tevita Motulalo, Senior Researcher, Gateway House. 

You can download the full report here.

Summary:

As the global centre of gravity shifts to the Indo-Pacific, triggered in part by Chinese expansion and the U.S.’s Pacific “rebalancing,” an expanding Indian engagement with the South Pacific becomes a geoeconomic and geostrategic imperative.

The South Pacific sits at the “pivot” of the Pacific rebalancing. It is a largely stable region with a relatively small population; it has abundant resources (the Exclusive Economic Zone of the country of Kiribati alone is 3.5 million square kilometres, greater than the total land and maritime EEZ area of India); it is at the crossroads of vibrant and growing maritime trade routes; and it is increasingly strategically located.

Under the “one country, one vote” rule of most international fora, the 14 Pacific Island Countries (PICs) play a significant role in deciding international institutional legitimacy, which is increasingly important for India as it seeks a greater role in global affairs.

There is enormous scope for closer economic, political, and strategic ties between India and the South Pacific. Ties between the two are already friendly and age-old, with myriad cultural compatibilities. But if India continues to neglect the region, it will become increasingly difficult for India to maintain, or to regain, a toehold, while other powers like China manoeuvre for, and establish, entrenched positions.

Just one example of India’s low-key engagement in the region: it has only two High Commissions in the 14 PICs. One is in Fiji, because of its sizable Indian diaspora, the other is in Papua New Guinea, because of trade and minerals. India routinely goes unrepresented at regional meetings held in the other 12 PICs. In contrast, China has a major diplomatic mission in almost every PIC.

India and the PICs are natural partners which only need to 6 build the right bridges to come together to make the South Pacific and thereby the greater Indo-Pacific more economically, politically, and strategically secure. Others have already realised the region’s potential and are moving fast. The question is: Will India catch the South Pacific wave, or be washed over by it?

Related reading:

1. India-Tonga: Old friends, new engagements

Gateway House published this Op-Ed, by Tevita Motulalo, on 29 May, 2012. He analyses whether India, an old friend of Tonga, can fit into the increasingly important Pacific region by building on traditional ties with the island-nation

2. The geo-strategic Pacific Islands

Gateway House published this Op-Ed, by Tevita Motulalo, on 27 May, 2012. He analyses how the need for resources, and the geopolitical shift towards Asia-Pacific have prompted nations to realize that the small island states in the South Pacific control large resource-rich ocean areas and are increasingly geostrategic.

http://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-strategic-imperative-in-the-south-pacific/

India and Japan’s Pacific agenda (Gateway House)

29 MAY 2013, Gateway House

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Japan’s Shinzo Abe are giving heft to a renewed partnership and a focus on the Indo-Pacific. Both nations must collaborate and work with South Pacific countries, especially Tonga, to counter China’s growing influence in this increasingly geopolitically important region

BY Tevita Motulalo 

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is currently in Tokyo to discuss with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, issues such as bilateral investment and cooperation on infrastructure, including Japanese assistance in modernising India’s rail system.

But it is the discussions about geo-strategy and the optimisation of foreign policy objectives, that will loom large on the agenda.  India will continue to guarantee Japanese interests in the Indian Ocean, while consolidating its relationship with other partners in the Pacific. Japan will position itself as a strategic economic partner for India, especially in the context of an increasingly aggressive China. But in an important addendum, on May 28, Singh announced that Japan is a “natural and indispensible partner” for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – clearly a counter to China’s growing influence in the region.

When Abe visited India in 2007, he spoke of the ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ – the Indo-Pacific – to a joint session of the Indian Parliament. Now, five years later, concerns have about the stability and security of the region have grown and it has become vital for Japan and India, the two pillars of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in the Indo-Pacific,  to cooperate in the increasingly pivotal region of the South Pacific.

The South Pacific, an 85-million square kilometres area or about a quarter of the world’s ocean, comprises 14 Pacific Island Countries (PICs), including Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and other independent or semi-sovereign countries. This greatest concentration of microstates on the planet, with small populations, has enormous resource-rich exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Kiribati alone has an EEZ the size of India.

China, acknowledging the region’s importance, has been ramping up its presence there. From 2005 to 2011, China poured $600 million in aid and soft loans into the region. [1] Tonga alone owes China up to a third of its GDP. New Zealand and Australia, both in the Pacific, shifted from being critical of opaque Chinese aid to partnering with China; New Zealand and China have a Free Trade Agreement and Australia and China have announced a currency pact.

It is strategic to ‘neutralise’ the Pacific in the event that China decides to use its leverage in the region against either India or Japan. An India-Japanese partnership will certainly maximise the relationships of both countries with the Pacific islands. Working together on the region’s development will increase their individual and joint stakes.

There are some models to work off. For instance, in August 2012, Japan and the U.S. agreed to collaborate in the PICs. Their areas of focus – disaster management, environmental issues, human security, people-to-people exchanges, and information sharing – indicate the sort of work Japan and India could collaborate on, helping to create real security and prosperity in the region.

Japan has been involved in the area’s development. Most recently in 2012, Japan pledged $500 million in aid to the PICS. [2] Most of this is relatively low profile, though vital to the Pacific economies. For example, after New Zealand installed a solar plant in the Kingdom of Tonga, with no storage capacity or micro-grid control system, Japan stepped in with the multi-million dollar cost of installing both. Japan got hardly any public acknowledgement for this aid.

Much of the aid given by Japan can be optimised at a low cost through Indian involvement. For example, Japan recently built a $ 30 million hospital in the Kingdom of Tonga. [3] Had Japan worked with India on the project, the hospital could have got low-cost Indian medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and even long-term telemedicine links to medical professionals in India. The cost difference would have been minimal or perhaps even a saving, with the impact multiplied. Both Japan and India would have gained in terms of local prestige and profile. Or, for example, Japan’s involvement in Tongan agriculture and fisheries can be enhanced by trilateral cooperation with India.

Part of the challenge for Japan’s engagement has been language – a problem India does not have with the PICs. Most PICs are English-speaking, and, like India, also emerging economies built on similar cultural values. Indian films, food and music are popular throughout the PICs – which gives India a soft power advantage that has not yet been properly appreciated.

India and Japan have various such complementary features that can be tapped. Japan excels in precision hardware, India excels in robust software. Japan’s ageing work force is highly qualified, a significant portion of India’s is English-speaking and young across a spectrum of skills.

India will benefit hugely by working with Japan in the PICs.  Apart from Fiji, India has a small footprint in this vast region of enormous resources and cumulatively lucrative and under-accessed markets, and 14 votes in international fora.  India has only two High Commissions in the 14 PICs: Fiji, because of its sizable Indian diaspora, and Papua New Guinea, because of minerals.

In Tonga, Japan has an Embassy, but India doesn’t – India’s Tonga representative is based in Fiji, leaving India unrepresented at most regional events in Tonga. Working with Japan would give India a way of engaging with the region that would be more in-depth and wider-ranging.

Tonga is politically pivotal to the South Pacific, and to any future Indian and Japanese interests in the region. Tonga is a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy, with a stable government for more than a century.  Never colonised yet part of the Anglo-sphere, Tonga has traditionally had a good relationship with India. This relationship could be leveraged, for example, if Tonga were to lobby on India’s behalf for a seat at the United Nations Security Council, and convince other Pacific countries to do the same. And, as a kingdom, Tonga has similar characteristics as the Japanese imperial system.

Like the other Pacific economies, Tonga does not want aid but assistance, safe investments and trade.  The PICs are all small economies that only need a fraction of the trade that Japan and India can generate. They are a potential destination for high-end niche products from both India and Japan. If India and Japan start working together to help develop, and then increasingly integrate, with the economies of the PICs, they will not only create regional security and prosperity for themselves and the PICs, but also a model that can be exported to other countries.

Tevita Motulalo is a Researcher at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. He has a Master’s degree in Geopolitics from Manipal University. Previously, he was the Editor of the Tonga Chronicle, the oldest English language newspaper in the Kingdom of Tonga. He has also been the Deputy Editor of Talaki, one of Tonga’s leading Tongan-language newspapers.

This feature was written exclusively for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive features here. 

For interview requests with the author, or for permission to republish, please contact Advait Praturi at praturi.advait@gatewayhouse.in or 022 22023371.

References

1. Hanson and Fifita. China in the Pacific: The New Banker in Town. Lowy Institute 2011. Retrieved from http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-pacific-new-banker-town
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. (2012). Sixth pacific islands leaders meeting (overview of outcomes). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/palm/palm6/lm_overview.html
3. Tonga Government Portal Ministry of Information and Communications. (2012).Grand opening of Vaiola hospital’s new health facilities by His Majesty King Tupou VI. Retrieved from http://www.mic.gov.to/health-a-ncds/community-health-a-development/3730-grand-opening-of-vaiola-hospitals-new-health-facilities-by-his-majesty-king-tupou-vi
4. http://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-and-japans-pacific-agenda/

The geo-strategic Pacific Islands (Gateway House)

BY 

Tevita Motutalo

27 SEPTEMBER 2012

 ,

Gateway House

Traditionally, the South Pacific islands have been considered strategically insignificant. However, the need for resources, and the geopolitical shift towards Asia-Pacific have prompted nations to realize that these small island states control large resource-rich ocean areas and are increasingly geostrategic.

“Five trillion dollars of commerce rides on the (Asia-Pacific) sea lanes each year, and you people are sitting right in the middle of it.”

- USPACOM chief Admiral Samuel Locklear, Pacific Island Forum, Cook Islands, 2012.

From August 27 - 31, leaders from countries as far afield as India, China and the U.S. converged on the tiny Aitutaki Island in the South Pacific to meet members of the 16-country Pacific Island Forum. The need for resources and geopolitical rebalancing has raised the profile of the region so much that, for the first time, a U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, attended the Forum — a clear demonstration that the U.S. is serious about its Pacific “pivot” to Asia.

The reason is China. In March last year, Clinton told the U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee about the region: “Let’s just talk straight realpolitik. We are in a competition with China. China is in there every day in every way, trying to figure out how it’s going to come in behind us, come in under us.”

Last weekend, U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta passed by New Zealand reinforcing Clinton’s Forum debut, and China’s Secretary of National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo returned from Fiji after inking several economic cooperation pacts with the military government there including Chinese assistance for cultural and educational development and teaching the Chinese language in the Fijian national curriculum. According to Wu, Sino-Fijian trade was worth $ 172 million last year, up from 34% in the year prior.

India’s delegation to the Forum was high profile, led by Minister of State for External Affairs E Ahamed. Apart from resources, and strategic positioning, the Pacific also controls a relatively large number of votes in international fora, and India is keen to secure support for its bid for a seat for the United Nation’s Security Council.

But one of India’s strongest allies in the region wasn’t invited – Fiji. A key item on the Forum’s agenda was whether or not to readmit Fiji. Fiji has been central to Indian interests in the region. Following the 2006 coup, at the urging of Australia and New Zealand, sanctions were brought against Fiji and, whilst also suspended from the Forum in 2009. When India attempted to assist, it was warded off by Canberra. Consequently, the Fijian regime fell in deep with the remaining alternative active player in the region, China, one of the biggest investors in the region thereby receiving generous economic and military cooperation from Beijing. The sanctions are of PIF-origin, and as China is not a member of the Forum, it is not bound to obey. These sanctions, issued by Australia, New Zealand, and the EU, resulted in the reduction of their aid assistance, a restriction on visas or transit for any member of the Fijian regime, and of course on trade.

The welfare of the more than 300,000 Fijian Indians in Fiji, and more amongst the Pacific states, is a core interest for India: a united, stable region decreases complications for region’s bloc support for India.

Fiji’s continued suspension is fragmenting the region. Isolated, Fiji shepherded a more consolidated, mineral-rich, Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)- though created in 1983 it remained docile within the Forum until, following Fiji’s lead, it was formalised in 2007 taking on a “Look North” foreign policy cline. This sub-regional grouping includes the majority ethnic Melanesian nations of Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, and is backed by China (which has built the MSG secretariat in Vanuatu). In response, last year, as relations continued to deteriorate, New Zealand by proxy, helped create a competing “Polynesian Leaders Group.” comprised of majority ethically Polynesian nations.

This use of racial politics – the attempt to pit against each other the normally friendly Melanesians and Polynesians – was spurred and sponsored by Australia and New Zealand because it seemed to suit their short-term political goals. Instead, it is creating regional instability, something that ultimately benefits China. China itself is also bringing volatility to the region, with increasing cases of crime and drug and human trafficking linked to Chinese nationals.

Australia and New Zealand can reverse this trend. Just before and since after this year's Forum, both country’s leaders have started echoing reintegration of Fiji into regional bloc, lifting sanctions, and also even further to incentivize positive developments that will lead to elections in 2014, as promised by the Bainimarama government.

The U.S. understands the implications and, before the Forum, expressed its expectation that Fiji be reinstated into the Forum. In spite of wide support, Australia and New Zealand blocked the move.

This raises questions about the priorities of some policy makers in Australia and New Zealand. They cite two reasons for the continued marginalisation of Fiji:

1. If Fiji relations are normalised, it may grow as a more important regional political and economic hub (given its central location even now most of the regional organisations’ headquarters are located in Suva), challenging Canberra and Wellington’s role as the go-to places for Pacific investment and regional insight.
2. While most in Wellington and Canberra undoubtedly value their strong relationship with the West, some policy-makers seem to be tempering that with a desire to have stronger economic and—as a result increasingly political–ties with China.

The second point is raising the most concerns in global capitals. Recently, former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called on the U.S. to “share” the Pacific with China. And New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Bill English declared that “Australia is a province of China, and New Zealand is a suburb of Australia.”

While Australia’s stated reason for the exclusion of Fiji from the Forum is its abolition of democracy, some influential figures in Canberra seem to have no problem engaging with even more autocratic governments that, unlike Fiji, have no plans to reintroduce democracy. In August, for example, Keating justified engagement with China by writing: “If we are pressed into the notion only democratic governments are legitimate, our future is limited to action within some confederation of democracies.”

Australian and New Zealand foreign policy is going through an internal civil war, with one side willing to sacrifice values and the trust of its traditional allies for the perception of economic gain from China (Wikileaks exposed that Australia pushed Nauru to derecognise Taiwan in favour of Beijing), and the other solidly part of the West.

Myopic and petty regional policies of Fiji’s marginalisation threw the door wide open for, and only benefits, China. Challenges to the region are heightening and so apparent, the U.S. now has to intervene directly to try to reinvigorate a West-friendly Pacific.

Clinton declared the region “strategically and economically vital and becoming more so,” yet “big enough for all of us.” But her presence was signal intent to counter Chinese inroads.

Beijing already assumes it has neutered Australia (and, presumably, doesn’t even bother about New Zealand). An editorial in the state-run People’s Daily—on 30^th August in response to the US’s aircraft carrier presence at the Forum—stated that, in the Pacific, “The U.S. may have evaluated that Australia alone is no longer enough to hold China at bay.”

For all the inroads created by inept policies in Fiji, Wu is reported to have taken a swipe at sanctions imposed on Fiji, and with a symbolic gesture, as guarantor of Fijian national interests, will oppose countries that are trying to “bully” Fiji. It effectively means China does not owe Australia and New Zealand any favours for misplacing their cards. Secondly, as China thinks its interests are linked with those of the island countries, this gives China opportunities for wide justification to intervene in South Pacific security – especially given the expectation afforded to it as a global power.

The divisive politics on show at the Forum need to stop. A first step, something that India can assist with, is welcoming Fiji back to the family, and helping it through its democratisation.

Tevita Motulalo is a Researcher at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. He is the former Editor of the Tonga Chronicle. He is currently pursuing a Master's Degree in geopolitics at Manipal University.

For interview requests with the Authors, or for permission to republish, please contact Advait Praturi at praturi.advait@gatewayhouse.in or 022 22023371.

Http://Www.gatewayhouse.in/Publication/Gateway-House/Features/Geo-Strategic-Pacific-Islands

India-Tonga: Old friends, new engagements (Gateway House)

After the passing of Tonga's revered King, Tupou V, all eyes are on the new establishment for signs of change in Tonga's foreign policy. How will India, an old friend to the Pacific island-nation, fit into this increasingly important region? Can it build on traditional ties with Tonga?

BY Tevita Motulalo, for Gateway House

On 18^th April, India lost a friend in the South Pacific when the King of Tonga, George Tupou V, 63, died in a Hong Kong hospital. Tupou V’s death plunged the tiny South Pacific island kingdom of 100,000 into mourning, and raised questions about the future direction of Tongan foreign policy at a time when China is gaining increasing sway in the Pacific.

There has been a long and deep relationship between the world’s largest democracy, India, and one of the world’s newest and smallest democracies, the Kingdom of Tonga. Tupou V, in power for just over five years, made a point of re-emphasizing the deep and traditional linkages between India and Tonga when, right after his coronation, he undertook a 19-day visit to India, one of his majesty’s longest state-visits. In so doing, he was following a family, and national, tradition.

His late father, King Tupou IV, visited India twice, in 1971 and 1976, and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the island kingdom in 1981. The warm relationship shared between the two countries is expressed through many anecdotes. According to former Indian Ambassador to Fiji and Tonga, T. P. Sreenivasan, when King Tupou IV, a large man, was bestowed a medal by Indira Gandhi, she “had to stretch herself to the extent possible on her high heels to reach his chest.” Sreenivasan called Tupou IVthe “Heaviest King of the Smallest Kingdom,” and then admiringly stated, “The smaller the country, the bigger the leader.”

Tupou IV showed a keen interest in learning from India's Green Revolution, its non-aligned position during the challenging times of the Cold War, and India’s military traditions. Tonga’s nobility and members of the royal family (including the current King’s brother) regularly receive military and administrative training in India, and Tonga was amongst the first to recognize an independent Bangladesh after 1972.

When Tupou V came to the throne, Tonga was an absolute monarchy. While long committed to democratizing the nation, perhaps influenced by what he saw in India, critics attacked Tupou V for what they considered to be the slow pace of reform. Soon after he came to power, in 2006, reformist rallies turned violent, resulting in over 80% of the capital, Nuku'alofa, being looted and burnt, and eight people dead.

This was a defining moment for the new king. Rather than retaliate, he directed the armed forces to “Protect the people and harm no one,” irrespective of political creed. Buildings can be rebuilt, he said to his commanders, but fathers, mothers, and children are irreplaceable, and protection against loss of life and injury were to be the ultimate goal. Normal life was restored with minimal violence.

In spite of the pressure from reformists and some Western countries, Tupou V wanted the democratic transition to be stable, and thought a rushed change could be problematic. In an interview with Australia’s ABC he said: “We don’t want a third world democracy. It’s quite laughable, (being) unstable. In some cases it would be perfectly dangerous.” He pointed out to the Australian interviewer: “Your country is about to send two thousand troops into the Solomon Islands! That’s what happens when you impose democracy overnight for the most undeniable reasons, without bothering to build an economic structure which would support democracy and give politicians an incentive to behave ethically.”

The transition to democracy finally happened, peacefully, with elections in 2010, which were widely lauded for being free and fair.

For traditional reasons, the king still works closely with government on foreign policy. In recent years, Tonga, like many countries in the Pacific, has been pulled closer to China. After the riots of 2006, the only country to come through with a large enough loan to rebuild the capital was China, and within the last decade, Chinese immigrants have taken over about 90% of the retail sector.

There is growing hostility in the country over the increasing Chinese influence. During the riots of 2006, around 30 Chinese shops were looted or burned, and 300 Chinese nationals evacuated back to China. Chinese nationals are regularly in the Criminal court in Tonga, including a recent case of human trafficking and prostitution. Regardless, those at the top continued the growing engagement with China, in part due to a failure of traditional partners, like New Zealand, to help it during difficult economic times.

The new king, Tupou VI, the English-educated 52-year-old, is inheriting an extremely complicated foreign policy dynamic. Tonga is supportive of the U.S. (to the point of sending troops to Afghanistan), indebted to China, and enmeshed with Australia and New Zealand which are undergoing strategic shifts.

The question is: where will India fit into this increasingly important region, and can it build on traditional ties with Tonga?

During the 1990s, Tupou V, then foreign minister, was responsible for the kingdom’s “Look West” policy, which ramped up Tonga’s engagement with Asia. Simultaneously, India developed and executed its own “Look East” policy, which was tailored for engagement with the burgeoning economies of the Asian Tigers. Oddly, these two traditional friends both considered themselves part of a growing Asia, and yet were so focused on the Asian ‘core’ that they largely missed out on each other.

Now, the importance of the Pacific is growing in the minds of Indian policy makers. The importance of India is also clear to all in the region, including Tonga, and it may be time for old friends to look at each other in new ways, especially now that Tonga has followed India’s lead in embracing democracy. Engagement would be mutually beneficial as there are myriad commonalities between the two; most importantly, Tonga may prove a useful bridge for India as it pursues a broader ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy.

Tupou V, friend of India, will be deeply mourned. But the passing of one King gives way to another. All eyes are on Tupou VI and the new government for signs of change in Tonga’s foreign policy. This is a critical moment. The Pacific is viewed by the great powers as a strategic play and the countries, small and big, in the region, are being courted as never before in their history. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has emphasized the U.S.’ ‘Asian Pivot’ and put the spotlight on the region. Renewed U.S. interest means more Chinese engagement. Even the Arab League is looking to improve relations with countries like Tonga. India has been slow to actively engage, but the traditional relationships are there to build on, and the compatibilities are enormous.

Recently, as part of the Tonga Energy Road Map (TERM), two Tongan grandmothers attended India’s Barefoot College to learn how to install solar panels in their villages. They loved their experience, saying how at home they felt in India, which like Tonga, values family, learning, community, democracy and hard work. Since returning home they have literally enlightened their communities with what India has to offer. With little effort, that light can shine even stronger in the years to come.

Tevita Motulalo is a geopolitics post-graduate research scholar at Manipal Univerity and an intern at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. He was Editor of the Tonga Chronicle.

Originally appeared: http://www.gatewayhouse.in/publication/gateway-house/features/india-tonga-old-friends-new-engagements